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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTA^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
ROY M. HELM, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No, 
14589 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Second Judicial District 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE Of THE CASE 
The appellant, Roy M. Helii, appeals from a 
judgment entered against him in the 
of Utah, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan presiding, following 
a conviction for tampering with evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on March 26, 
1976, of tampering with evidence in (violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-510 (1953), and sentenced April 19, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an orjder of this Court 
affirming the verdict of the jury ar^ d the judgment of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of 
facts as submitted by Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE DID PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF 
ITS CASE AND THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING 
APPELLANTfS MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, 
In order to satisfy its burden of proof, 
the State must present sufficient evidence to 
establish each element of the crime charged. Proper 
reading of the applicable statutes and careful 
examination of the testimony presented at trial 
necessitate the conclusion that the State carried 
its burden in the present case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1973), reads 
in part: 
"A person commits a felony 
of the second degree if, believing 
that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about 
to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, con-
ceals or removes anything with a 
purpose to impair its verity or 
availability in the proceeding or 
investigation." 
-2-
The first requirement for a person to be 
guilty of this crime is that he believes an official 
proceeding or investigation pending or about to be 
instituted. 
Appellant's argument in regards to this 
requirement interprets the wording too compartmentally. 
The point at which an investigation ends and an official 
proceeding begins is not always clear and definite. 
The line appellant wants to draw between the two is not 
always present. 
Appellant's argument also seems to ignore some 
basic facts of this present case. It is clear from the 
testimony of both Trooper Busch and Sergeant Hatch that 
Mr. Eccles had been arrested for driving under the influence 
of alcoholic beverages by Trooper Busch and that he had 
been taken to the Farmington Sheriff's Office for the 
purpose of being booked into the jail for this offense. 
Appellant was completely apprised of this situation by 
the time he arrived at Farmer's State Bank. 
It is obvious that appellant, a Colonel in the 
Highway Patrol, knew that an official judicial proceeding 
-3-
against Mr. Eccles would soon be instituted to adjudicate 
this charge. Appellant also knew that the evidence 
gathered by Trooper Busch would be essential for the 
purpose of the State proving its case in such a proceeding. 
The narrow interpretation of the statute advocated 
by appellant is so restrictive that the purpose and interest 
of the statute would be defeated. 
The second element of this crime, concealing or 
removing the materials, was satisfied when appellant retained 
the evidence which Trooper Busch had assembled. Appellant 
caused this evidence to be removed from the trooper and 
therefore removed it from the normal, procedural course 
it would have followed had appellant not intervened. The 
retension of this evidence is concealment due to the mere 
fact it rightly should have been returned to the trooper 
or turned in to be properly dealt with and filed. 
" . . . [I]ntent may be 
inferred from conduct of a 
defendant and from circumstantial 
evidence upon which reasonable 
inferences may be based." 
Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68 
(Wyo. 1972); Stuebgen v. State, 
548 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1976); 
People v. Braly, 532 P.2d 325 
(Colo. 1975). 
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Appellant questioned Trooper Busch as to 
whether or not anyone had seen Mr. Eccles being brought 
into the station; he recognized th^t proceedings were 
inevitable against Mr. Eccles unless he intercepted the 
damaging evidence; he reiterated, deveral times, that 
Mr. Eccles was a powerful person who could harm the 
Highway Patrol; he took control of the evidence that 
night and never returned it to the investigating 
officer. 
All these facts lead to the reasonable inference 
that appellant removed and concealep this evidence for 
i i 
the purpose of impairing its availability at any future 
proceeding which would be instituted against Mr. Eccles 
in regards to this drunk driving charge. The motive for 
such action was to insure that Mr. feccles would not 
retaliate against the Highway PatrojL or individual 
officers. Although this intent was not obvious at the 
time appellant asked for and took the evidence, such 
intent is obvious when one views th& totality of 
appellant's actions in regards to this evidence. 
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POINT II 
TESTIMONY GIVEN BY STATEfS WITNESSES DID 
NOT REQUIRE CORROBORATION AND THE COURT PROPERLY 
DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), states 
in part: 
"A conviction shall not be 
had on the testimony of an 
accomplice/ unless he is corroborated 
by other evidence, which in itself 
tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense. . . . " 
Apparently it is appellant's argument that 
there was a conspiracy among appellant and Statefs 
witnesses and therefore the State's witnesses were 
accomplices of appellant. Both the basis and conclu-
sion of this argument are fallacious. 
Conspiracy is a specific intent crime. There 
was nothing said or done by appellant or State's witnesses 
which implied that any of them had the intent to make an 
agreement to conceal or remove the evidence. The troopers 
had no idea that appellant would consequently do just that. 
Without this intent, without an agreement, there could be 
no conspiracy. 
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The more relevant conclusion, however, is 
that State's witnesses were not accomplices of the 
appellant. 
This Court has had several opportunities 
to define the meaning of "accomplice." 
"In this State we have no 
statutory definition of accomplice, 
but the court has cqnstrued the 
word to refer to one who is or 
could be charged as a principle 
with defendant on trial." State 
v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 Pac. 
203 (1929); State v. Fertig, 233 
P.2d 347 (1951); State v. Kasai, 
27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 
(1972). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1973), spells 
out who can be guilty as a principle: 
"Every person, feting with 
the mental state reqiiired for the 
commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who 
solicits,requests, commands, 
encourages or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such Conduct." 
Again, the all important intent is 
lacking. These two troopers had no knowledge or 
-7-
intent that the evidence would be kept and concealed 
by appellant, and, in fact, subsequently signed a 
complaint against Mr. Eccles on this charge (T.28). 
Although it was logical for the troopers to assume 
that appellant was going to give Mr. Eccles special 
treatment in this matter, it did not follow that he 
would break the law in doing so. They are guilty 
only of following orders—orders which were not 
patently criminal or wrongful. It is quite common 
and totally acceptable for an officer to permit 
a senior officer to intervene in particularly 
sensitive situations. 
Since the State's witnesses lacked the 
necessary intent to be charged as a principle, 
they are not accomplices and their testimony is 
more than sufficient to sustain this conviction. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
SENTENCE THE APPELLANT. 
Utah law requires that: 
"[A]fter a verdict ot 
guilty if judgment is not 
arrested. . . the Court must 
appoint a time for pronouncing 
judgment, which must be I at least 
two days and not more than ten 
days after the verdict.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953, 
as amended). 
This statute presents the problem of determining whether 
the word "must" is mandatory or directory only. An 
analysis of cases through the years 4staklishes the process 
through which this determination can 
be made. 
In an early case the United States Supreme 
Court discussed the meaning of "shall" within a statute 
that said every probationer shall be given a hearing. 
most accurately 
alone and then The Court first considered the words 
considered the purpose of the statute' 
"The defendant shall be dealt 
within a stated way; it jis language 
of command, a test of significance, 
though not controlling. . . Doubt, 
however, is dispelled wh^n we pass 
from words alone to a vifew of the 
ends and aims." Escoe v. Zerbst, 
Warden, 295 U.S. 490 (19J35) 
(Emphasis added). 
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The Court concluded that the purpose of the statute 
was to protect the defendant from malicious, ungrounded 
charges and therefore "shall" was seen as command language* 
In State v. Nelson, 200 Kan. 411, 436 P.2d 
885 (1968)r the Kansas Supreme Court applied this same 
test to determine the meaning of a statute, similar 
to the one in question, which said "if motion for new 
trial is overruled, sentence shall be imposed within 
five days. . . . " They reasoned that: 
" . . . [w]hen the legislature 
prescribes a time when an official 
act is to be performed, the broad 
legislative purpose is to be con-
sidered by the cour.ts whenever they 
are called upon to decide whether 
time prescribed by statute is mandatory 
or directory." Id. 887. 
In viewing the statute they concluded the purpose was 
to "prevent prolonged, unreasonable delay in the 
sentencing of the defendant" and since the delay was 
not unreasonable, even though more than five days had 
elapsed, the court still had jurisdiction. 
The Ninth Circuit concurred with this process 
when it stated: 
" . . . The interpretation of these 
words [shall and may] depends upon 
the background circumstances and con-
text in which they are used and the 
intention of the legislative body or 
administrative agency which used 
them." United States v. Reeb, 433 F. 
2d 381, 383 (Ninth Circuit 1970). 
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Even in the case of Anderson v. Yungkau, 
329 U.S. 482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed.436 (1946), 
which the appellant cites for proposition that "shall" 
was a word of command and not advisory, the Court 
buoyed their definition by concluding that " . . . 
[rjeasons of policy support this construction." Id. 
486. 
A singular look at the words of the statute in 
question would suggest that it is a ijaandatory time 
limit. However, it is important to ipake a further 
step and determine the legislative purpose for this 
statute. The purpose of the minimum[limit is to 
mandate time for the judge to review the case and the 
I 
defendant and determine an appropriate sentence. The 
purpose of the maximum limit is to adsure that the 
defendant will not be unreasonably detained without 
any sentence. The reason for the d^lay in imposing 
the sentence in the present case was that the judge 
had not received a report from the Adult Probation 
Department. Without this report the pudge could not 
make an intelligent assessment of the appellant and 
therefore could not impose a well determined sentence. 
The delay was for the benefit of the Appellant in that 
it assured a fairer sentence. 
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This was especially true in this case be-
cause the appellant had not offered any evidence 
in his defense nor had he given his account of 
the situation. Without the report the judge had 
absolutely nothing by which to evaluate the appellant. 
Even the appellant's counsel recognized the importance 
of having available additional information at time 
of sentencing when he asked that the results of 
a polygraph test be made part of the file and taken 
into account when the judge decided on the sentence, 
(T.94). 
When dealing with the meaning of this 
statute previously, this Court stated: 
"This court has held that the 
time fixed by the statute is not 
jurisdictional. . . and since it 
is regarded as merely directory 
the further provision that the 
judgment should be rendered within 
a reasonable time has been read 
into the statute." State v. Fedder, 
262 P.2d 753, 755 (1953). In 
accord State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d 
456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974). 
Considering the acceptable excuse for the 
delay it must be concluded that sentence was rendered 
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within a reasonable time and the cc^ urt had jurisdiction 
to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, respondent respectfully 
requests that the judgment of the lower court be 
affirmed. 
Respeatfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attornleys for Respondent 
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